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Abstract—We design and assess some practical low-density
parity-check (LDPC) coded transmission schemes for the Gaus-
sian broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC). This
channel model is different from the classical wiretap channel
model as the unauthorized receiver (Eve) must be able to decode
some part of the information. Hence, the reliability and security
targets are different from those of the wiretap channel. In order
to design and assess practical coding schemes, we use the error
rate as a metric of the performance achieved by the authorized
receiver (Bob) and the unauthorized receiver (Eve). We study the
system feasibility, and show that two different levels of protection
against noise are required on the public and the secret messages.
This can be achieved in two ways: i) by using LDPC codes with
unequal error protection (UEP) of the transmitted information
bits or ii) by using two classical non-UEP LDPC codes with
different rates. We compare these two approaches and show that,
for the considered examples, the solution exploiting UEP LDPC
codes is more efficient than that using non-UEP LDPC codes.
Index Terms—Broadcast channel with confidential messages,
low-density parity-check codes, physical layer security, unequal
error protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
The BCC [1] is a well-known transmission model for
communications achieving security at the physical layer, which
generalizes Wyner’s wiretap channel model [2]. Since its in-
troduction, a lot of work has been done to study the BCC from
the information theory standpoint, mostly aimed at computing
the secrecy capacity regions for this channel and its several
variants (see [3]–[5] and the references therein). More recently,
the secrecy capacity regions have been studied also for the
BCC with multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) [6]–[8] and
cooperative communications [9].
For the classical wiretap channel, the use of several practical
families of codes has already been investigated: this is the case
of lattice codes [10], polar codes [11] and LDPC codes [12].
Instead, for the BCC, despite the large amount of theoretical
work, there is still a lack of practical systems able to achieve
some specific security and reliability targets. The use of coding
is recognized as an important tool also in such a context, but
most studies consider the abstraction of random coding [13],
which indeed is difficult to translate into a practical coding
scheme. At the authors’ best knowledge, the only proposal
of using a family of practical codes over this special channel
appeared very recently in [14], and exploits polar codes. Other,
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and even more widespread families of codes, like LDPC codes,
have never been considered in such a context.
In this paper, we focus on the Gaussian BCC and study some
practical LDPC coded transmission schemes for achieving
reliability and security over this channel. For this purpose, we
follow some recent literature and use the error rate as a metric
[12], [15]–[18]. We define suitable reliability and security
targets for the Gaussian BCC in terms of the error rate, and
redefine the concept of security gap, defined for the Gaussian
wiretap channel as the quality ratio between Bob’s and Eve’s
channels needed to achieve the reliability and security targets.
We consider LDPC codes, since they are state-of-the-art
codes able to approach the channel capacity under iterative
decoding. We show that, in order to achieve transmission
reliability and security over the BCC, a coding scheme with
two different levels of protection against noise is needed. For
this reason, we consider an LDPC code with UEP capability,
and compare its performance with that achievable by using
two different non-UEP LDPC codes.
The organization of the paper is as follows: in Section II we
define the system model and the metrics adopted. In Section
III we study the use of single codes with different rates. In
Section IV we introduce UEP LDPC codes into the system.
In Section V we assess the performance achievable through
the considered codes and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In the Gaussian BCC, we have one transmitter (Alice) send-
ing broadcast and confidential information over the channel.
Bob is able to decode the whole information, while Eve is able
to get only the public message, ideally without gathering any
useful information on the secret message. Both the Alice-Bob
and the Alice-Eve channels are supposed to be Gaussian.
We assume that each transmitted message is formed by n
bits and includes a public and a confidential part. We also
suppose to use coding, and that each transmitted message
contains k information bits and r = n − k redundancy bits.
It follows that the overall code rate is R = k
n
, and R also
coincides with the overall information rate, expressed in bits
per channel use, under the hypothesis of binary phase shift
keying (BPSK) modulation. In our model, each transmitted
message contains a block of ks ≤ k information bits which
are secret, while the remaining kp = k − ks information bits
form a block of public information. It follows that the secret
and public information rates are Rs = ksn and Rp =
kp
n
,
respectively, and R = Rs +Rp.
Concerning the redundancy part, we can suppose that it can
be split into two groups: rs ≤ r redundancy bits are used to
check the ks secret information bits, while the remaining rp =
r − rs bits check the public information bits. This hypothesis
will be removed when we will consider codes with UEP, in
which some protection classes are defined without splitting the
redundancy among them. If we assume to use two different
channel codes for the secret and the public parts, their code
rates are R(s)c = ksks+rs and R
(p)
c =
kp
kp+rp
, respectively. If we
define ρ = ks+rs
n
, we have Rs = R(s)c ρ, Rp = R(p)c (1 − ρ)
and R = R(s)c ρ+R(p)c (1− ρ).
A. Reliability and security metrics
We consider that both Bob’s and Eve’s channels are ad-
ditive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels or, equiv-
alently, quasi-static fading channels (QSFCs) with channel
gains γ(B) and γ(E), respectively, expressed in signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) per bit. Other channel models, like the fast fading
channel, are outside the scope of this paper, and will be studied
in future works. P (γ) denotes the overall frame error rate
(FER) as a function of the SNR γ, that is, the probability
that, within a received frame of n bits, one or more of the k
information bits are in error after decoding. Similarly, Ps(γ)
(Pp(γ)) denotes the block error rate (BLER) for the secret
(public) information block, i.e., the probability that, within a
received frame of n bits, one or more of the ks (kp) secret
(public) information bits are in error after decoding. Let us fix
two small threshold values, δ and η, and define the security
and reliability targets in terms of the decoding error probability
as follows:
Pp(γ
(B)) ≤ δ, (1a)
Pp(γ
(E)) ≤ δ, (1b)
Ps(γ
(B)) ≤ δ, (1c)
Ps(γ
(E)) ≥ 1− η. (1d)
Let us suppose that the public information blocks are more
protected against noise than the secret information blocks.
This scenario is exemplified in Fig. 1, where we suppose
that the public information blocks experience a lower BLER
than the secret information blocks. Conditions (1) can then be
translated in terms of Bob’s and Eve’s SNRs, i.e., γ(B) and
γ(E), respectively. More precisely, by looking at the figure,
we have that conditions (1a) and (1c) become
γ(B) ≥ max {βp, βs} = βs, (2)
whereas conditions (1b) and (1d) become
βp ≤ γ
(E) ≤ αs. (3)
It follows from (3) that, for the system to be feasible,
we must actually ensure that the public message is more
protected against noise than the secret one (this typically
implies R(p)c < R(s)c ). In fact, if the opposite occurs, since
γ
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Fig. 1. Expected block error rate curves for the public and secret messages
as functions of the SNR.
1−η > δ, we have αs < βp, and condition (3) cannot be met.
From the theoretical standpoint, the system is feasible even
when αs = βp. This obviously is a limit condition, while from
the practical standpoint it is useful that αs > βp, and that the
ratio αs
βp
is quite greater than one, such that the system remains
feasible even when γ(E) has some fluctuations. In this work
we neglect this fact, since we only consider static (or quasi-
static) channels, and the only constraint we impose is αs ≥ βp.
The ratio αs
βp
will be studied in future works, where non-static
channels will be considered as well.
When the system is feasible, i.e., the public message is more
protected against noise than the secret one, and αs ≥ βp, we
can compare different coding techniques by using the security
gap Sg, defined as the ratio between Bob’s minimum SNR and
Eve’s maximum SNR:
Sg =
βs
αs
. (4)
Obviously, the smaller the security gap, the better the system
performance, since security can be achieved even with a small
degradation of Eve’s channel with respect to Bob’s channel.
Based on the above considerations, the design target is to
find codes which make the system feasible. In fact, differently
from the wiretap channel model, in this case there is no
guarantee that the system is feasible even when Eve has a
degraded channel with respect to Bob. Then, a meaningful
objective is to find codes able to achieve small security gaps.
We will face these problems in the next sections.
B. Message concatenation and all-or-nothing transforms
In order to increase the difference between the two levels
of protection against noise for the public and secret messages,
we can resort to message concatenation [18] and all-or-
nothing transforms (AONTs) [19]. Let us suppose that L
secret messages, each with length ks, are concatenated and
then transformed through an AONT. The transformed string
is then transmitted in L fragments, which replace the original
messages. Only if all of them are correctly received, the
AONT can be inverted and the L secret messages successfully
obtained; otherwise, none of them can be even partially
recovered. Through concatenation, the error probability on
each secret message becomes
P (L)s (γ) = 1− [1− Ps(γ)]
L
≥ Ps(γ). (5)
Hence, for a given γ(E) = γ¯(E), if Ps(γ¯(E)) does not meet
the security condition, we can resort to message concatena-
tion and AONTs, and find a suitable value of L such that
P
(L)
s (γ¯(E)) overcomes the security threshold.
Obviously, when we introduce message concatenation and
AONTs, we must replace Ps(γ) with P (L)s (γ) also for Bob.
Hence, the use of these tools is paid in terms of the SNR
working point for Bob, which increases with respect to the
case without concatenation. In addition, increasing L increases
the latency for receiving the secret message. Concerning the
implementation of an AONT, several examples can be found
in the literature. For the purposes of this study, we observe that
scrambling the information bits through a linear (and dense)
map can achieve features similar to those of an AONT, thanks
to the randomness of the errors induced by the channel [18].
We note that AONTs can also be used, at higher layers,
to achieve some desired level of computational security. In
fact, the condition (1d) only guarantees that Eve’s decoder
has a high error probability on the secret blocks. However,
this does not exclude that some secret blocks may be correctly
decoded by Eve. Furthermore, even when Eve’s decoder is in
error, some bits within the block may be correct. Therefore, as
often occurs in physical layer security, this setting represents
a substrate which must be exploited by higher layer protocols
to achieve some desired level of computational security.
III. USING TWO DIFFERENT LDPC CODES
Let us suppose to use two different LDPC codes to encode
the public and the secret information blocks. For the sake of
simplicity, our choice is to split the transmitted frame into
two codewords of length n/2. One of these two codewords
is obtained from an LDPC code Cp, having rate R(p)c , and
carries the kp public information bits. The other codeword
belongs to an LDPC code Cs, with rate R(s)c and corresponds
to the ks secret information bits. Since the two codes have the
same length, provided that they are well designed, it must be
R
(p)
c < R
(s)
c to achieve a higher level of protection against
noise for the public information block.
Example III.1 Let us consider n = 2048 and two LDPC
codes with the following parameters:
• Cp: length 1024, rate R(p)c = 0.2.
• Cs: length 1024, rate R(s)c = 0.8.
Their variable and check node degree distributions have been
optimized through the tools available in [20]. Concerning the
choice of the node degrees, for the variable nodes we have
used the same degrees we will consider in Example IV.1,
while for the check nodes we have considered a concentrated
distribution (i.e., with only two degrees, concentrated around
the mean). The resulting variable and check node degree
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Fig. 2. Error rate curves for two different LDPC codes with length n = 1024
and rates R(p)c = 0.2, R
(s)
c = 0.8, with and without concatenation of the
secret messages (indicated in the superscript of Ps(γ)).
distributions are, respectively,
λ(x) = 0.1765x19 + 0.2392x18 + 0.0638x17 + 0.0988x16
+ 0.0117x15 + 0.1976x2 + 0.2124x,
ρ(x) = 0.1607x6 + 0.8393x5, (6)
for the first code, and
λ(x) = 0.8815x2 + 0.1185x,
ρ(x) = 0.1708x14 + 0.8292x13, (7)
for the second code. These degree distributions have been
used to design the parity-check matrices of the two codes
Cp and Cs through the zigzag-random construction [21], [22].
The performance of these codes, assessed through numerical
simulations, and using the log-likelihood ratio sum product
algorithm (LLR-SPA) with 100 maximum iterations for decod-
ing, is reported in Fig. 2, also considering some examples of
concatenation of the secret message (L = 100, 1250, 10000).
IV. USING UEP LDPC CODES
Let us suppose to use a single UEP LDPC code with length
n. Most of the existing works on UEP LDPC codes aim at
designing codes with three protection classes (PCs):
• PC1 contains k1 < k information bits which are those
most protected against noise.
• PC2 contains k2 = k−k1 information bits which are less
protected against noise than those in PC1.
• PC3 contains the whole redundancy part (r = n−k bits).
Codes of this kind are suitable for the considered scenario. In
fact, given an UEP LDPC code with the three PCs outlined
above, we can map the public message bits into PC1 (i.e.,
kp = k1) and the secret message bits into PC2 (i.e., ks = k2).
To design LDPC codes with good UEP properties, several
approaches have been proposed in the literature [22]–[24]. All
these methods aim at optimizing the node degree distributions
in such a way that the variable node degrees are spanned in
a wide range, and good convergence thresholds are achieved
under iterative decoding. Then the variable nodes with the
highest degrees are mapped into the bits of PC1, whereas the
others form PC2 and PC3 (depending on their association with
information or redundancy bits).
Once the variable node degree distribution λ(x) has been
designed, the number of bits in PC1 can be easily computed
by converting λ(x) from the edge perspective to the node per-
spective, the latter being expressed through another polynomial
ν(x) =
∑
i νix
i
, and then computing the fraction of variable
nodes with the highest degrees, that are those in PC1. We have
νi =
λi/i
∑dv
j=1 λj/j
, λi =
νi · i
∑dv
j=1 νj · j
, (8)
where dv denotes the maximum variable node degree. The
same formulas can also be used for the check node degree
distributions, by putting ρ in place of λ, c in place of ν and
dc in place of dv , where dc is the maximum check node degree.
Hence, ρ(x) and c(x) are the check node degree distributions
from the edge and the node perspectives, respectively.
For the sake of simplicity, for the check node degrees we
adopt a concentrated distribution, as already done in Section
III for the case of different LDPC codes. Hence, we have
c(x) = ax⌊cm⌋ + bx⌈cm⌉, (9)
where cm = Er =
∑
j
vj ·j
(1−R) and E is the total number of edges
in the Tanner graph. The coefficients a and b are obtained as:
a = ⌈cm⌉ − cm, b = cm − ⌊cm⌋. (10)
Example IV.1 Let us consider the following UEP LDPC
variable node degree distribution taken from [24, Table 3], with
some minor modifications to adapt the proportion between
PC1 and PC2 in such a way that it coincides with the one
used in Example III.1:
λ(x) = 0.0025x19 + 0.0009x18 + 0.0031x17 + 0.0630x16
+ 0.3893x15 + 0.2985x2 + 0.2427x. (11)
The corresponding node perspective distribution is
ν(x) = 0.0005x20 + 0.0002x19 + 0.0007x18 + 0.0151x17
+ 0.0835x16 + 0.4054x3 + 0.4946x2. (12)
The nodes in PC1 are those with degree ≥ 16, while those
with degree ≤ 3 are in PC2 or PC3 depending on their
association to information bits or redundancy bits. This way,
we find that PC1 and PC2 contain, respectively, 20% and
80% of the information bits. By using this distribution for the
variable nodes and a concentrated degree distribution for the
check nodes, we have designed three UEP LDPC codes with
n = 1024, 2048 and 4096. Their parity-check matrices have
been obtained through the same zigzag random procedure used
in Section III. The performance obtained by these codes under
LLR-SPA decoding with 100 maximum iterations is reported
in Figs. 3-5. Some examples of the use of concatenation of
secret messages are also shown in Figs. 3 and 4.
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Fig. 3. Error rate curves for an UEP LDPC code with length n = 1024 and
PC1 and PC2 with proportions 20%− 80%, with and without concatenation
of secret messages (indicated in the superscript of Ps(γ)).
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Fig. 4. Error rate curves for an UEP LDPC code with length n = 2048 and
PC1 and PC2 with proportions 20%− 80%, with and without concatenation
of secret messages (indicated in the superscript of Ps(γ)).
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Fig. 5. Error rate curves for an UEP LDPC code with length n = 4096 and
PC1 and PC2 with proportions 20%− 80%.
V. PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
We fix two values for the reliability and security thresholds,
namely, δ = 10−4 and η = 0.1. Actually, one could think
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT OF THE CODING SCHEMES IN EXAMPLES
III.1 AND IV.1 (βp, αs, βs AND Sg ARE IN dB) .
Scheme n L βp αs βs Sg
UEP 1024 10 2.34 2.46 5.74 3.28
non-UEP 2048 1250 3.81 3.83 6.65 2.82
UEP 2048 5 2.13 2.37 5.43 3.06
UEP 4096 1 1.99 2.01 4.98 2.97
that a decoding error probability equal to 0.9 for Eve does
not represent a condition of sufficient security. However, we
remind that this setting only provides a substrate over which
any desired level of computational security can be achieved
through higher layer techniques, as described in Section II-B.
Furthermore, our purpose is just to compare the considered
coding schemes, not to define any absolute security level. For
each coding scheme, we choose the smallest value of L such
that the system is feasible, i.e., αs ≥ βp. Finally, we compute
the values of βs and the security gap Sg , according to (4).
The results obtained by considering the coding schemes in
Examples III.1 and IV.1 are reported in Table I. From these
examples, we observe that using UEP LDPC codes is actually
effective for implementing practical transmission schemes over
the BCC, since the system feasibility is achieved even with a
small number of concatenated messages, and the security gap
values are in the order of 3 − 3.3 dB. Increasing the block
length improves performance: apart from a small reduction
in the security gap, longer codes require a smaller SNR for
Bob and less concatenation. In fact, while an UEP LDPC
code with n = 1024 requires L = 10 and βs = 5.74
dB, by increasing n to 4096 we reduce βs to less than 5
dB (thus reducing Bob’s SNR), and we no longer need the
concatenation of secret messages for the system to be feasible.
Instead, using two different codes is not a good choice, as
we observe by comparing the second and the third rows of
Table I. In fact, for n = 2048, the two non-UEP LDPC codes
considered in Example III.1 achieve some small reduction
in the security gap, but they require a very high level of
concatenation (L = 1250) for the system to be feasible. This
increases the minimum SNR for Bob by more than 1 dB, and
also has detrimental effects on the system latency.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied the performance of some practical LDPC
coded transmission schemes for the BCC. We have used the
error rate as a metric, and proved that two different levels
of protection against noise are needed for the public and the
secret messages.
For this purpose, we have considered both UEP LDPC codes
and classical non-UEP LDPC codes. We have considered some
specific sets of parameters to provide some practical examples.
For the considered cases, our results show that rather small
security gaps can be achieved, and that using long UEP LDPC
codes is advantageous, since it allows to avoid the use of
message concatenation, thus reducing the required SNR and
the transmission latency.
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